To Trillion(s) and Beyond: A SpaceX IPO Odyssey!

Spaceships, Satellites and AI!

In 2001, A Space Odyssey, a movie that was well ahead of its time when it was released in 1968, Hal (the computer) famously responded to questions about his reliability with “it (mstakes) can only be attributable to human error”. I was reminded of my fallibility repeatedly as I tried to value SpaceX ahead of its initial public offering, a market debut that is shaping up as a barn-burner for three reasons. The first is that in a market where there are many young companies all trying to claim to be futuristic in their offerings, SpaceX clearly stands out as the real thing, with rockets, satellites and AI all residing under its corporate umbrella. The second is that its founder (Elon Musk) is the richest person in the world, has upended one legacy business (autos), bought a social media company as a soapbox and made his presence felt on the the political stage. Love him or hate him, Musk is definitely not boring, and his capacity to spin business narratives that seem outlandish at first hearing. but become conventional wisdom later, clearly adds to the allure of SpaceX. Third, if the private market pricing feeds into the public offering, SpaceX could very well become the most valuable IPO of all time, joining the rarefied list of trillion-dollar companies, on listing. That said, I may be getting a little ahead of the game here, because SpaceX has not filed a public prospectus yet, and little is known about its financials other that drabs of information that have been leaked to the press. I will forge on, nevertheless, with the stipulation that this is a first iteration, and that I will revisit it, as more information comes out about the firm’s financial standing and its IPO plans.

The History of SpaceX

You may be surprised to hear that SpaceX is older than Tesla, at least in terms of chronological age, founded on March 14, 2002, in El Segundo, California. At its founding, Musk stated its goals as reducing the costs of space transportation and travel to Mars, but was viewed as having little chance of success by the space establishment, composed then of government agencies (NASA) and a few defense firms (Boeing and Northrop Grumman). SpaceX applied the lessons of modular engineering from the software business and it launched Falcon 1, its first space launch vehicle in September 2008; that successful launch led to a NASA contract for $1.6 billion, and rescued the company from near bankruptcy. In subsequent years, SpaceX developed Falcon 9, a reusable and heavier vehicle, with the Dragon Spacecraft unit, and became the first commercial entity to deliver cargo to the International Space Station. In 2013, SpaceX launched its first mission for a private customer, and quickly secured a dominant market share of commercial launch contract market. In recent years, SpaceX has invested in an even more ambitious version (in terms of size and power) of reusable spacecraft with Starship, and while its first launch in 2023 exploded in space, the company is clearly moving towards making it functional.

Along the way, the company added to its business mix, first with The Boring Company, a company that specialized in building tunnels that could be used to transport people, in 2017, before spinning it off as a separate entity. More significantly, in 2019, the company launched sixty Starlink satellites, with the end game of offering satellite-based internet services to customers, especially in areas where conventional internet service was limited. That endeavor has now grown to include thousands of satellites and had more than ten million active subscribers spread across the world, at the end of 2025. In February 2026, the company created its third business arm, with its acquisition of xAI, the parent to Grok, the Musk-developed competitor in the LLM space.

SpaceX had a slow start financially, as its initial years were spent developing the Falcon 1 rocket, and even after that development, the dependence on the US government and commercial satellite launchers resulted in revenues growing much more slowly than they did at Tesla, Musk’s other high-profile creation. Even as late as 2021, SpaceX reported revenues of just over $2 billion, almost entirely from its launch business, but Starlink’s subscriber based model has allowed revenues to increase more than five-fold since, reaching an estimated $15.6 billion in 2025, with just under 30% coming from the launch business ($4.1 billion) about the rest from Starlink subscriptions and related businesses ($11.4 billion); xAI, which was acquired in 2026, had subscription revenues of roughly $100 million in 2025. Without full financials to back up the statement, it is estimated that SpaceX generated an EBITDA of $8 billion in 2025, though with depreciation and other expenses considered, it is not clear how much (if any) operating (or net) profits the company delivered during the year.

On the funding front, Elon Musk used a portion of his winnings ($180 million) from his PayPal exit as seed money ($100 million) for founding SpaceX, but the company has required multiple rounds of venture capital to fund its infrastructure needs. The first venture capital round of about $12 million was in 2002, but there have at least thirty additional infusions amounting to more than $12 billion. While SpaceX counts big name venture capitalists in its investing roster (Founders Fund, Andreessen Horowitz and Sequoia), it has also seen increasing investments from public equity investors such as Fidelity and public tech companies such as Google. While these venture capital investments have diluted Musk’s ownership over the years, he continues to own about 42% of the equity in the company, and with differential voting rights, close to 80% of the total voting rights in the company.

Valuing SpaceX

It is true that intrinsic valuation, at least in its discounted cash flow avatar, is much easier to do at companies that have many years of historical data and peer groups of companies in the same business, and there are some who view one or both as pre-requisites. If you adopt that point of view, it is easy to see why so many view SpaceX as a company that cannot be valued (yet), since you don’t have access to even a single year of financials, let alone a long history, and there are no true competitors. In fact, it is likely that even if the financial statements are made public in a prospectus, most will continue to avoid valuing the company, using uncertainty about the future as an excuse. If you define intrinsic value as the value of a business based upon its capacity to generate cash flows in the future, there is nothing in that definition that requires either historical data or peer group information, and statistically, the fact that you face uncertainty or that you are missing information does not imply that you cannot make estimates, just that the estimates will be noisier.. I have long argued that you can estimate the value of young companies with minimal data, as long as you build a valuation around a business narrative, and accept that this valuation will change, as circumstances do, and with SpaceX, I will get a chance to put this argument into practice.

To value SpaceX, I consider each of its three core businesses separately since they differ not just on operating metrics, but also on the competition faced in each one.

• The launch business, which is where SpaceX was born, is still its most identifiable business, and frames the company’s story not just as a futuristic company, but one that was able to overcome some of the most significant technological challenges of any start up and not just survive but thrive. SpaceX has established such a robust and long-standing cost advantage over its competitors in the business, stemming from its existing infrastructure investments and reusable rocket technology, that it had a market share in excess of 80% of the launch market in 2025. Its competition will come from some private and government-funded players, who may be able to capture market share, notwithstanding their higher costs, due to security and nationalistic concerns..

  • Valuation narrative: The space launch market is estimated to be about $30 billion in 2026 and is expected to grow to $100 billion in 2036, as government and private business demand increases. SpaceX will continue to dominate the business, albeit with a slightly less dominant market share (70%, down from >80% in 2025) of the total market and as costs decrease with scale, operating margins will increase over time to 40%. (I am being conservative in my estimates, insofar as I am ignoring space travel and expanded business opportunities in space, but I don’t think, at the moment, that either offers a viable path to augmenting revenues).

• The internet service business, built around Starlink, is the business that accounts for almost two thirds of the revenues of the company in 2025, and it builds on the infrastructure built for the launch business, since SpaceX has used it to launch thousands of satellites into space. At the end of 2025, Starlink had close to 10,000 satellites in space, about two thirds of the entire global count, and is adding to that number every month. That has allowed it to double its subscriber numbers to just over 10 million, in the last year, and while Amazon’s acquisition of GlobalStar has brought a potential competitor into the mix, GlobalStar has a fraction of the satellites that Starlink does. The challenge for any satellite-based internet service provider is that notwithstanding the use of low-earth orbit (LEO) satellites to improve service, the broadband service lags more conventional internet technology (fiber optic and cable) in much of the world, leaving it (at least for the moment) with a niche market of rural areas, countries with damaged or no infrastructure and people on the go (airplanes, trains and cars). Thus, while the total internet service market is estimated to be close to a trillion and a half dollars globally, in 2025, satellite-based service accounted for about 1% of that market, delivering under $15 billion in revenues, with StarLink having a dominant market share.

  • Valuation narrative: The satellite internet services market will continue to grow, as technology improves service quality and transit demand for better wifi grows, from $15 billion to $160 billion (from less than 1% to 10% of of the internet service market) over the next decade. Starlink will see more competition, but its lead in satellites and capacity to use its launch business to get more into space, will give it a substantial advantage and a market share of 75% of the overall market). The cost of customer acquisition will ease over time, as business customers become a larger portion of the business, and operating margins will approach 60% in steady state, as the unit economics are very positive.

• The Large Language Model (LLM) business, from the acquisition of xAI, has brought AI into the SpaceX story, and while that may add to the pricing excitement, Grok lags the other LLMs in terms of revenues and reach, for the moment. In terms of usage, Anthropic (with Claude), OpenAI (with ChatGPT) and Google (with Gemini) are not only more widely used than Grok, in business setting, but are further along in converting them into revenues. While Grok has been bundled into the X Premium subscriptions, and earned about $80 million in revenues in 2025, it seems to be focusing more on consumers and only on niche portions of the business market. This is the most diffuse and volatile of the three markets, in terms of potential market, since the potential market can run from the tens of billions (if they remain subscription-based) to hundreds of billions or even trillions (if they become replacements for human labor or massive productivity boosters). It is possible that Grok may concede the larger and more competitive business space to Claude and ChatGPT and focus instead on consumer subscriptions, giving it a smaller market, but one with less competition.

  • Valuation narrative: The overall LLM market will continue to grow, but more in business applications than in consumer apps, with the market size being determined by how well AI can replicate human labor and regulatory restrictions. xAI will target primarily consumer subscription revenues and niche business applications. That will give it smaller revenues ($80 billion in 2036) than its LLM competitors, but one with less competition and higher margins (50% operating margin), and less reinvestment as it avoids going head-to-head with Anthropic, OpenAI and Google for business use.

• It is undeniable that SpaceX, as a lead player in three fast-growing and volatile businesses, may be able to use its infrastructure to expand each of these businesses. The space launch business, which has generally focused on delivering commercial or government loads and satellites into outer space may become a springboard for space travel, for leisure, research or business. With its satellite broadband offerings, the possibility exists that the technology and the reach will improve to a point where the service can compete with fiber-optic and cable broadband offerings, perhaps at much lower cost. With xAI, the possibility that Grok finds a way to outflank its LLM rivals, including Claude, Gemini and ChatGPT, in terms of business offerings may be low, but it does exist. The recent acquisition of Cursor, a young AI company in the coding space, suggests that xAI has not thrown in the towel on business applications. In truth, these are all options that may not be viable at the moment, but if they become viable, could add immense value.

  • Valuation narrative: This part of the story is built on the expansion options that SpaceX has to enter large markets, with low probability and high payoff. In a crude attempt to capture this part of the story, I will attach an expected revenue in 2036 to these other businesses of $50 billion and an operating margin of 30%. Since these expansion options, if they do exist, will not show up in the near future, the revenues from these options ramp up after year 6 (2032) in the valuation.

Pulling these storylines together as valuation inputs, I estimate the following numbers for 2036, for the three business lines and for the expansion options category:

With these numbers in place, and using a cost of capital reflective of SpaceX’s business mix (of aerospace/defense, telecom services and AI) of 8%, we can estimate the company’s value:

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With my story and inputs, the value that I derive is $1.22 trillion, about 10% below the private market pricing and about a third below the expected IPO pricing, but still astonishingly high for a company with $15.5 billion in revenues in the most recent year, and a host of question marks about corporate governance. Note that in this iteration, I have ignored cash and debt, since I do not have the company’s financial statements, but it is unlikely that either will have much of an impact on the value of equity for a company with this high a value for its operating assets.

As you can see, the SpaceX story not only has many moving parts, but is fraught with uncertainty, and without full financials, it does not have a good starting point. That said, as the story plays out, we will get more clarity, and the story will need to be reworked, with the value consequences unclear. For the moment, though, I am uncertain about every input in my SpaceX valuation, but uncertainty is a continuum, and I am less uncertain about some inputs (such as the revenues and margins in the space launch and satellite internet service businesses) than about other inputs (including the revenues and margins of the LLM and expansion businesses). If you are wondering why the cost of capital is only 8% for the company, close to the median cost of capital for a US company, it is because much of the risk here is specific to the company (thus reducing the effect in a diversified portfolio) and cuts in both directions (upside and downside). In fact, if there are outliers, they are more likely to be on the upside than the downside. With these considerations in mind, I tried to be open about how uncertain I feel about my estimates, and the results of a simulation yields the following distribution for value:

Since the simulation is centered on the same expected values for inputs as I used in my base case, it should come as no surprise that the median value, across ten thousand simulations, of $1.29 trillion is close to the base case valuation of $1.22 trillion. As the pricing for the IPO starts to gain traction, it is worth recognizing that a $1.75 trillion or even a $2 trillion pricing falls in the range of the distribution, though with little or no upside left for an investor paying that price.

If you feel that it is best to wait for the prospectus to be filed, before doing the valuation, I understand but there are three points worth remembering. First tt is unlikely that the prospectus will contain data that will move the intrinsic value story, since none of the numbers in the reported statements will be large enough to alter the immense value coming from expectations of future growth. Second, while the prospectus will contain estimates of total addressable market and perhaps even profitability, in my experience, it will be hype; expect to see trillions of dollars thrown around nonchalantly for market size. Third, as I see it, it is not an either/or proposition, since I can value the company now, and revisit the valuation when the prospectus comes out, with the advantage being that you are less likely to be swayed by the sales pitch in the prospectus.

Pricing SpaceX

In an initial public offering, companies are priced, not valued, by bankers (for the offering price), by investors (as the stock starts trading) and by observers to make judgments (on whether it over or underpriced). Thus, you can make the argument that the valuation, with all of its moving parts, is irrelevant, and that you should price SpaceX, not value it, if your intent is to trade on the IPO. That is a legitimate critique, but the argument that pricing somehow dispenses with the need to make assumptions about market size and profitability or does not have the same uncertainties is not. You can take issue with the intrinsic valuation because of the layers of assumptions that I had to make along the way, and I know that for many investors, either invested already in the company ,or planning to invest in it, a pricing may seem less daunting. While I sympathize, I am afraid that the uncertainty will be just as much of an issue in pricing SpaceX, and to see why, take a look at the steps in the pricing process:

At each step in the process, you will run into issues.

• On the pricing metric front, the problem with picking a metric is an information vacuum, with only two scalars, revenues and EBITDA, available, and even if you consider the most recent private market pricing, which priced the company at about $1.25 trillion, as the market value of equity, the absence of debt and cash numbers makes it impossible to back into enterprise value. This problem should be resolved, for the most part, when the company files a full prospectus, but for the moment, if you assume that the net debt number is close to zero, the resulting enterprise value of $1.25 trillion yields nosebleed multiples of 81 times revenues and 156 times EBITDA for the company, using 2025 numbers. Cven with minimalist information, there will be pricing variants that use expected revenues (or EBITDA) in a future year as a scalar, as can be seen in this graph:

  

There is no inherent problem with using forward numbers in pricing, as long as you do the same for all of the companies in your peer group, but in the case of SpaceX. it is inevitable that bullish analysts, unable to justify the sky high pricing values with trailing 12-month numbers, will resort to using forward pricing, and add to the bias, by inflating revenues in future years. In the graph, I have used the forecasted revenues in 2030 and 2035, from my intrinsic valuation, and the EV to Sales ratio drops from 80.13 (112.18) to 3.91 (5.47), using the private company (estimatedIPO offering) pricing of $1.25 trillion ($1.75 trillion) as the enterprise value.

• The even bigger challenge in pricing SpaceX will be in the second step, where you have to find comparable firms (or a peer group) to base your pricing on. There is obviously no company out there that is remotely similar to SpaceX, as a composite company, and even if you break it down into businesses, it is likely that you will hit roadblocks. On the space launch business, using publicly traded aerospace and defense companies like Boeing and Northrop Grumman is a non-starter, because they are low growth, lower-margin businesses, unlike SpaceX. Palantir may seem like a logical alternative, and while it may have high growth potential, it is a data/software company that does not have the infrastructure needs that SpaceX does. On the internet service business again, there are conventional telecom firms like Verizon and T-Mobile, but the economics of their offerings are different, and they are not growth companies. In April 2026, I computed the multiples of revenues and EBITDA that publicly traded companies in the aerospace/defense, internet services businesses and technology companies trade at, and they are far lower than what SpaceX can be expected to trade at, if it goes public at $1.5 to $2 trillion:

  

• Finally, on xAI, there are other LLMs, almost all of which are private companies now, and while you can use the pricing from most recent VC rounds, you are on shaky grounds. Even if you forged ahead with a peer group of high-growth, tech companies, your pricing will almost certainly have to revolved around revenues, rather than profits, and based upon very small samples.

• The one part of pricing that you will almost certainly see is the story telling, especially with analysts who are locked into finding SpaceX to be a buy, with the pricing more of an ex-post rationalization than a analytical tool. No matter what peer group you pick, SpaceX will be priced higher than comparable firms, and to back the argument that it is still a good investment, you will hear stories of its large potential market, significant competitive advantages and profitability. All of these stories are grounded in truth, but they are empty if they remain stories. I will predict that there will be far more buy than sell or hold recommendations for SpaceX, when it does go public, with analysts doing pricing gymnastics with forward multiples, hand-picked peer groups and fairy tales to justifying their positions.

Pricing is an exercise in data analysis, and any pricing of SpaceX will reflect the statistical limitations of the data. Put simply, the only difference between intrinsic valuation and pricing, when it comes to the uncertainties you face with SpaceX, is that with the former (intrinsic valuation), you have to face up to the uncertainties and make your best explicit judgments (on revenues, margins and reinvestment), whereas with the latter (pricing), they remain implicit. If bias is your biggest adversary in assessing SpaceX, and you use pricing, it is very likely that you will find a pricing metric and hand-picked peer group to reflect your biases, and then tell yourself a story on why SpaceX is cheap or expensive.

The Bottom Line

SpaceX is an engineering marvel that has shown its naysayers, which included almost every luminary in the space community, to be wrong. That said, for potential investors, there are lessons to be learned from watching Musk’s stewardship of Tesla. As with all of Musk’s creations, SpaceX will be a shape shifting entity, frustrating investors who expect companies to follow linear paths in the corporate life cycle, going from young growth to maturity; it will shift from one narrative to another, often with no advance warning, causing whiplash for investors. When I bought Tesla in 2019, after its stock had taken a beating, I described the company as my corporate teenager, and with Musk in full control, SpaceX is likely to follow the same unpredictable path. That makes it a difficult company to buy, but it makes it an even more dangerous company to sell short, as Tesla short sellers have discovered in the last two decades. With all that said, SpaceX is a unique company with immense competitive advantages, and while I would not be interested in buying at the rumored IPO pricing of $1.75 trillion, it is one big correction away from being fairly priced or even cheap. If that happens, I will be a buyer, but will do so with the recognition that this company comes packaged with a founder who is both uniquely gifted and deeply flawed, and complaining about the parts of Musk you do not like, while enjoying the fruits of the aspects that you do, is unfair.

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1. Valuation of SpaceX in April 2026 (Pre-IPO, and with limited financials)